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Abstract
In this paper we show a new method for calculating the nucleolus by solving
a unique minimization linear program with O(4n) constraints whose coeffi-
cients belong to {−1, 0, 1}. We discuss the need of having all these constraints
and empirically prove that they can be reduced to O(kmax2
n), where kmax is
a positive integer comparable with the number of players. A computational
experience shows the applicability of our method over (pseudo)random trans-
ferable utility cooperative games with up to 18 players.
Keywords: Cooperative games, Nucleolus, Order median problem.
1. Introduction
This paper presents new advances on computing the nucleolus of a coop-
erative game with side payments as defined by Schmeidler [19]. Kohlberg [7]
proved that the nucleolus can be found by solving a unique linear program of
extremely large size with O(2n!) constraints. Owen [14] showed how this pro-
gram can be reduced to a more tractable size of O(4n) constraints, although
the constraint coefficients are very large. On the other hand, Maschler, Pe-
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leg and Shapley [11] gave another method for finding the nucleolus by giving
a constructive definition of the lexicographic center of a cooperative game
and showing the equivalence between this concept and the nucleolus. In
their approach they have to solve a sequence of O(4n) minimization linear
programs with constraint coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}. This approach was im-
proved by Sankaran [18] who gave a method for computing the nucleolus
solving a sequence of only O(2n) minimization linear programs with con-
straint coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}. Hallefjord et al. [6] considered games whose
characteristic function is given from mathematical programming problems,
and calculated the nucleolus of such games. For this aim, only those coali-
tions whose characteristic function is required for calculating the nucleolus
are considered. Later Potters et al. [17] described a fast algorithm to find
the nucleolus of any game with non-empty imputation set. This algorithm
is based on solving a prolonged simplex algorithm. It requires solving n− 1
linear programs with at most 2n + n − 1 rows and 2n − 1 columns. Since
then, one can find some improvements on the computation of the nucleolus
in particular classes of games, but not much has been done on the general
case. In this regard, it is worth underlying the paper by Leng and Parlar [10],
which develops an algebraic method for finding the nucleolus of any 3-player
game with non-empty core. This method is based on a division of different
cases depending on the values of the characteristic function.
Despite its computational complexity, the nucleolus has proven very effec-
tive in real cost allocation problems. One of the most well-known applications
of the nucleolus are the bankruptcy problems, where it was proven by Au-
mann and Maschler to coincide with the talmudic rule, see [1]. More recent
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applications are, for instance: Lemaire [9] applies (among other allocation
rules) the nucleolus for allocating costs in insurance companies; Songhuai et
al. [20] apply the nucleolus for power losses allocation in electrical markets,
which is accepted as it satisfies open, equal, and impartial principles; Le Bre-
ton et al. [8] use the nucleolus and the Shapley value for the production and
finance of public projects.
In this paper, we show an alternative method for computing the nucle-
olus of an n-person cooperative game by solving one unique minimization
linear program with O(4n) constraints whose coefficients are in {−1, 0, 1}.
Although the complexity of the new problem is similar to Owen’s one (see
[14]), the advantage of the new proposal is that all constraint coefficients are
in {−1, 0, 1}, whereas in Owen’s formulation some coefficients are extremely
large. Besides, we propose a solution method that avoids the problem of hav-
ing too small constants and significantly reduces the number of constraints.
Thus, our formulation gives a computationally more stable method. This
special form of the program has proven to be specially suitable for other op-
timization problems, like the convex order median location problem (see the
book by Nickel and Puerto [12]). Recent applications of such problems can
be found in Blanco et al. [3] and Espejo et al. [4].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives some needed
preliminary concepts. In Section 3 we formulate the nucleolus as the solution
to a unique LP problem whose resolution is discussed in Section 4. Section 5
illustrates our procedure, which is tested via some experiments in Section 6.
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2. Background
Cooperative game theory studies decision processes that involve several
agents (players) which are allowed to cooperate. This branch of applied
mathematics is attracting more and more attention to the scientific commu-
nity. A proof of that are the ten Nobel prize laureates in Economic Sciences
related with game theory (the last two in 2012).
Given the set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a coalition of N is any subset
S ⊂ N . The set of all possible coalitions of N shall be denoted by 2N . We
define the characteristic function as the map
v : 2N −→ R
S −→ v(S),
(1)
where v(S) represents the maximum profit that the coalition S can make
by acting on its own, without taking into account what the other players in
N \ S can do. So, v(N) is the best payoff that the coalition formed by all
players can obtain. This coalition, N , is called the grand coalition. We set
v(∅) = 0.
Therefore, a cooperative game can be represented by Γ = (N, v) where
N is its set of players {1, 2, ..., n} and v is its characteristic function.
One problem faced by cooperative game theory is that of allocating the
benefit obtained by the grand coalition among the players. One such alloca-
tion is the nucleolus, introduced by Schmeidler in [19]. For the definition of
the nucleolus, the concept of excess vector is needed. The vector of excesses
of an allocation x ∈ Rn is the vector θ(x) ∈ R2
n−1 defined as:
θ(x) = (e(S, x)), with e(S, x) = v(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi ∀ S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. (2)
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The nucleolus is the unique vector that lexicographically minimizes the non-
increasing sorted vector of excesses.
Allocations x such that e(S, x) = 0 if S = N and e(S, x) ≤ 0 for any
other coalition S, are known as core allocations. If the core of a game is
nonempty, its nucleolus is a core allocation. Although core allocations have
been widely used in the literature for the fairness conditions they satisfy (all
coalitions receive at least the value of their characteristic function), there are
some recent papers that discuss about some drawbacks of core allocations
and go beyond this set (e.g. see Perea et al. [16] or Audy et al. [2].)
In what follows we restrict ourselves to the nucleolus of a cooperative
game defined on the set of pre-imputations, namely the set
I = {x ∈ RN :
n∑
i=1
xi = v(N)}. (3)
Note that e(N, x) = e(∅, x) = 0 for all x ∈ I, and we therefore consider only
2n − 2 coalitions (all S ∈ 2N − {∅, N}.) Needless to say that the results
obtained in this paper clearly extend to any polytope.
The following 3-player example illustrates these concepts.
Example 2.1. Consider the following characteristic function:
v({i}) = v({1, 3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 3, v({2, 3}) = 1, v(N) = 4,
and the following two pre-imputations:
x = (2.5, 1, 0.5), y = (1.5, 2, 0.5).
Their excess vectors (sorted in a non-increasing way) are:
θ(x) = (−0.5,−0.5,−0.5,−1,−2.5,−3).
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θ(y) = (−0.5,−0.5,−1.5,−1.5,−2,−2).
Therefore, θ(y) <L θ(x) (where <L means lexicographically smaller). Actu-
ally, it can be proven that y is the nucleolus of this game.
For the sake of readability, we embed the problem in R2
n−2×Rn, a space of
large dimension where the first 2n−2 coordinates correspond to the excesses
(where we assume an ordering on the subsets of N which is arbitrary but
fixed) and the remaining n to players’ allocations. In this space, we deal with
the polytope
P = {(θ, x) ∈ R2
n−2 × Rn : θS ≥ v(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi, S ⊂ N and
n∑
i=1
xi = v(N)}.
This way we shall simultaneously identify the nucleolus (x∗) and its excesses
(θ∗).
Let (θ(1), ..., θ(2n−2)) be the vector obtained by sorting θ in non-increasing
order, i.e., θ(1) ≥ θ(2) ≥ ... ≥ θ(2n−2). In [13] it is proved that, if λ1, ..., λ2n−1
are constants sorted in nondecreasing order with λ2n−1 = 0, then
∑2n−2
i=1 λiθ(i)
can be represented as the solution value of the following linear programming
problem:
min
∑2n−2
k=1 (λk − λk+1)(ktk +
∑2n−2
i=1 di,k)
s.t. di,k ≥ θi − tk ∀ i, k = 1, ..., 2
n − 2,
di,k ≥ 0.
(4)
In the following section we will prove that, for a convenient choice of the con-
stants λ, a modification of problem (4) gives the nucleolus of any cooperative
game.
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3. The main result
Theorem 3.1. Given a cooperative TU-game (N, v), its nucleolus is the
unique solution to the following minimization linear program with O(4n) vari-
ables and constraints whose coefficients are in {−1, 0, 1}:
min
∑2n−2
k=1 (λk − λk+1)(ktk +
∑2n−2
i=1 dik)
s.t. dik ≥ θi − tk ∀ i, k,
dik ≥ 0 ∀ i, k
(θ, x) ∈ P,
(5)
with λk = δ
k−1, k = 1, ..., 2n − 2, λ2n−1 = 0 and a convenient choice of δ.
Proof. The nucleolus (θ∗, x∗) corresponds to the lexicographical minimiza-
tion of the non-increasingly sorted vectors of excesses. Therefore, there ex-
ists a permutation σ(θ∗), of (1, . . . , 2n − 2), that sorts the elements of the
θ-variables such that (θ∗, x∗) is the lexicographical minimum with respect to
the θ-variables (excesses).
First of all, it is a folklore result that on compact domains lexicographical
minimization is equivalent to linear programming. This can be traced back
(at least for finite sets) in [5, p.70] and one explicit proof can be found in the
CEnter Discussion Paper No. 20006-89 by S. Tijs. In any case and for the
sake of completeness, we prove that after sorting the θ-variables according
with the permutation σ(θ∗), the nucleolus (θ∗, x∗) is the unique minimum of
the linear function (1, δ, δ2, . . . , δ2
n−3, 0, n. . ., 0)(θ, x)t on Pσ(θ∗), the polytope
that results from P after reordering the first 2n − 2 coordinates according
with the permutation σ(θ∗), for some δ < 1.
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Take z ∈ ext(Pσ(θ∗))−{(θ
∗, x∗)}, where ext(Q) denotes the set of extreme
points of the set Q. Denote by z≥ = (z(1), ..., z(2n−2), x) the vector obtained
from z after sorting its 2n−2 first components in non-increasing order. Due to
the uniqueness of the nucleolus, we know that there exists r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2n−
2} such that θ∗k = z(k) for k < r and θ
∗
r < z(r). Thus, for any δ > 0 we have
that
(1, δ, δ2, . . . , δ2
n−3, 0, n. . ., 0)[z≥ − (θ
∗, x∗)t]
= δr−1(z(r) − θ
∗
r) +
∑2n−2
k=r+1 δ
k−1(zk − θ
∗
k)
= δr−1[(z(r) − θ
∗
r) +
∑2n−2
k=r+1 δ
k−r(zk − θ
∗
k)]
= δr−1K(δ).
(6)
Note that limδ→0K(δ) = (z(r)−θ
∗
r) > 0. Therefore, there exists δ
∗ so that
K(δ) > 0 ∀ δ < δ∗. Hence, the scalar product in (6) is positive, at least, for
any δ < δ∗.
Hence, for all δ < δ∗ one has that
(1, δ, δ2, . . . , δ2
n−3, 0, n. . ., 0)[z≥ − (θ
∗, x∗)t] > 0 ∀ z ∈ ext(Pσ(θ∗)) \ {(θ
∗, x∗)}.
(7)
However, for z = (θ∗, x∗)t, it attains the null value. Thus,
(θ∗, x∗) = argmin{(1, δ, δ2, . . . , δ2
n−3, 0, n. . ., 0)(θ, x)t : (θ, x) ∈ ext(Pσ(θ∗))}
∀ δ < δ∗.
(8)
Thus, once the permutation that gives the lexicographic ordering in the
optimum is known, finding the nucleolus reduces to solving a linear program.
Nevertheless, in order to apply the above argument we need to prove that
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the problem that gives the lex-minimum, namely
min
∑2n−2
i=1 δ
i−1θ(i)
s.t. θ(1) ≥ θ(2) ≥ . . . ≥ θ(2n−3)
(θ, x) ∈ P
(9)
can be written as a linear programming problem. This formulation is doable
using the result in [13], see problem (4). Consider linear programming prob-
lem (5). The objective function and the first group of constraints represent
the ordered weighted sum of the values
∑2n−2
k=1 λ
kθ(k), where θ(1) ≥ θ(2) ≥
. . . ≥ θ(2n−2). Notice that this formulation results from the reformulation of
the ordered median problem that appears in [13, Section 3] (see also [12]). It
is clearly applicable here because we consider the convex case of the weighted
ordered average, i.e δ0 ≥ δ1 ≥ . . . ≥ δ2
n−3 ≥ 0. This formulation, together
with the fact that for the permutation σ(θ∗), (θ∗, x∗) is the unique mini-
mum of (1, δ, δ2, . . . , δ2
n−3, 0 n. . . 0)(θ, x)t on Pσ(θ∗), proves that computing
the nucleolus of an n-person cooperative game is equivalent to solving the
continuous linear program (5), which has O(4n) variables, O(4n) constraints
with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}.
The uniqueness in the solution to (5) comes from the fact that, on compact
and convex domains, the nucleolus is unique (see for instance [19] or [7]).
Because we are dealing with allocations in the compact and convex set I, see
(3), this uniqueness result follows. 
The reader may have noted that a key aspect in the previous proof is the
calculus of δ∗. The following lemma gives an explicit estimate of an upper
bound for such a constant.
Lemma 3.1. Let β = min{(z(r) − z
′
(r)) : z, z
′ ∈ ext(P ), r ∈ {1, ..., 2n −
9
2} so that z(k) = z
′
(k) ∀ k < r, z(r) > z
′
(r)}, and let δ
∗ = β
2v(N)+β
. Then, for
all δ < δ∗ we have that K(δ) > 0.
Proof. Let θ∗ be the excesses produced by the nucleolus x∗ sorted in
a non-increasing way. Take z ∈ ext(P ) \ {θ∗, x∗} in the conditions of the
lemma, and let r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2n − 2} be such that θ∗k = z(k) for k < r and
θ∗r < z(r). It is clear that (z(r) − θ
∗
r) ≥ β. Thus, if δ < δ
∗, we also have that
δ <
z(r)−θ
∗
r
2v(N)+(z(r)−θ∗r)
, because function f(y) = y/(a+ y) is monotone increasing
for all y 6= a if a > 0. Therefore the following inequalities hold:
δ <
(z(r) − θ
∗
r)/2v(N)
1 + (z(r) − θ∗r)/2v(N)
⇒ δ + δ
(z(r) − θ
∗
r)
2v(N)
<
(z(r) − θ
∗
r)
2v(N)
,
which implies that
δ
1− δ
<
(z(r) − θ
∗
r)
2v(N)
.
Since δ < δ∗ < 1, the last inequality implies
∞∑
k=2
δk−1 <
(z(r) − θ
∗
r)
2v(N)
⇒
2n−2∑
k=r+1
δk−1 <
(z(r) − θ
∗
r)
2v(N)
⇒
2n−2∑
k=r+1
δk−12v(N) < (z(r) − θ
∗
r)⇒
2n−2∑
k=r+1
δk−1(v(N)− (−v(N))) < (z(r) − θ
∗
r).
Now, since the excesses are within [−v(N), v(N)], it follows that θ∗k < v(N)
and z(k) > −v(N). Therefore
2n−2∑
k=r+1
δk−1(θ∗k − z(k)) < (z(r) − θ
∗
r)⇒ (z(r) − θ
∗
r) +
2n−2∑
k=r+1
δk−1(z(k) − θ
∗
k) > 0.

We note that calculating this upper bound may be a difficult task depend-
ing on the structure of the polytope P . In our computational experiments
we have taken δ = 0.1 with satisfactory results.
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4. Computational aspects
We have proven in Theorem 3.1 that the nucleolus can be solved by means
of the following LP problem:
min
∑2n−2
k=1 (λk − λk+1)(ktk +
∑2n−2
i=1 di,k)
s.t. di,k ≥ θi − tk ∀ i, k = 1, ..., 2
n − 2,
θi = v(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
xj , ∀ i = 1, ..., 2
n − 2,
∑n
j=1 xj = v(N)
di,k ≥ 0
(10)
with λk = δ
k−1, k = 1, ..., 2n − 2 and λ2n−1 = 0.
Although our approach proves that the nucleolus is computable by this
single LP problem, this method may be affected by current implementation
of LP solvers due to actual precision in representing primitives (scalars).
A problem of this formulation is that, due to the small magnitude of
constants δk, they may be considered as zero by computers when k is “large”.
In order to solve this drawback, we propose the following iterative process.
Assume the maximum k so that δk can be ensured strictly positive by
computer precision is kmax − 1. Therefore, we set λk = 0 ∀ k > kmax. With
these new values, the objective function in (10) becomes
kmax∑
k=1
(λk − λk+1)(ktk +
2n−2∑
i=1
di,k). (11)
Note that, after this adaptation, variables tk, dik do not appear in this ob-
jective function for all k > kmax, and therefore the first set of constraints of
problem (10) can be reduced to
di,k ≥ θi − tk ∀ i = 1, ..., 2
n − 2, k = 1, ..., kmax, (12)
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which consists of O(kmax2
n) constraints instead of O(4n). The reader may
observe that the solution to this problem lexicographically minimizes the
kmax largest excesses. If the solution to this problem gives the nucleolus, we
stop. Otherwise, we let Tk = (kt
1
k +
∑2n−2
i=1 d
1
i,k) for k = 1, ...kmax, where t
1
and d1 are the values of variables t and d in the optimal solution. Tk is the
sum of the kth largest excesses (see [13], Lemma 1). If this problem does
not yield the nucleolus, in a following iteration we fix the values of the kmax
largest excesses to be equal to those calculated before, and lexicographically
minimize the kmax + 1, ..., 2kmax largest excesses.
Therefore the objective function becomes
2kmax∑
k=kmax+1
(λk−kmax − λk+1−kmax)(ktk +
2n−2∑
i=1
di,k). (13)
The first set of constraints reduces to
di,k ≥ θi − tk ∀ i = 1, ..., 2
n − 2, k = 1, ..., 2kmax. (14)
And we now add this new set of constraints:
ktk +
2n−2∑
i=1
di,k = Tk, k = 1, ..., kmax, (15)
which aim at fixing the kmax largest excesses. If this procedure does not give
the nucleolus, we store Tk = (kt
2
k +
∑2n−2
i=1 d
2
i,k) for k = kmax + 1, ..., 2kmax,
where t2 and d2 are the optimal values of variables t and d in this second
problem.
Therefore, in this iterative process, the m-th iteration solves the following
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linear programming problem:
min
∑mkmax
k=(m−1)kmax+1
(λk−(m−1)kmax − λk+1−(m−1)kmax)(ktk +
∑2n−2
i=1 di,k)
s.t. di,k ≥ θi − tk ∀ i = 1, ..., 2
n − 2, k = 1, ..., mkmax,
θi = v(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
xj , ∀ i = 1, ..., 2
n − 2,
∑n
j=1 xj = v(N),
(ktk +
∑2n−2
i=1 di,k) = Tk, k = 1, ..., (m− 1)kmax,
di,k ≥ 0.
(16)
Note that problem (16) lexicographically minimizes the (m−1)kmax+1, ..., mkmax
largest excesses, while the first (m− 1)kmax are fixed to the values found in
previous iterations. This way we guarantee that the mkmax largest excesses
are lexicographically minimized.
This process should stop when, among the excesses that have been lexico-
graphically minimized, there is a value that is unique, see [15] page 331–332.
The solution to the last LP problem would give the nucleolus of the game.
A pseudocode of this process is given in Algorithm 1.
We would like to emphasize that the above iterative approach is not the-
oretically necessary since our approach obtains the nucleolus by solving a
unique LP problem. Nevertheless we have tested that in actual computa-
tional experiments this algorithm helps to avoid problems with tolerance of
current LP solvers and speeds our process up.
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Data: A TU-game (N, v)
Set STOP := False and m = 1;
while STOP = False do
Solve (16);
if there is a unique value among the mKmax first excesses then
STOP = True;
else
Tk := ktk +
∑2n−2
i=1 di,k, ∀ k = 1, ..., mKmax ;
m→ m+ 1 ;
end
end
Result: (x∗, θ∗), the nucleolus of (N, v) and its excesses.
Algorithm 1: Iterative process to solve problem (5).
5. Illustrative example
In this section we show the applicability of our approach by calculating
the nucleolus of a 14-player game. The ordering of the coalitions Sk, k =
1, ..., 214 = 16384, is such that k = 1 +
∑
j∈Sk
2j−1, with S1 = ∅.
The characteristic function of each coalition Sk is calculated as v(Sk) = 0
if ∃ j = 1, ..., n : 2j−1 + 1 = k or k = 1, v(S2n) = 1, and v(Sk) =
1
(n(n+1)/2)
∑
j∈Sk
(j −mod(k, j)) otherwise. Function mod(k, j) yields the re-
mainder when dividing k by j. Adding this function in the definition of the
characteristic function gives a pseudorandom aspect to these games, although
they can be replicated easily. Note that v(∅) = v({j}) = 0 ∀ j and v(N) = 1.
Note as well that v(S) ∈ (0, 1) for any other coalition S.
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5.1. Solution in one step
Our procedure, taking kmax = 20 and δ = 0.1, obtained the following
allocation:
x1 = 0.032074, x2 = 0.017313, x3 = 0.038355, x4 = 0.032074, x5 = 0.054903,
x6 = 0.054392, x7 = 0.059653, x8 = 0.076455, x9 = 0.085445, x10 = 0.091726,
x11 = 0.098008, x12 = 0.106997, x13 = 0.123545, x14 = 0.129061.
The largest excess is −0.009500. We emphasize that the 16th excess is
the unique excess whose value is −0.010776, meaning that both the previous
and the following excesses are different. Therefore, there is no other alloca-
tion x′ that yields the same excesses. Because of that we can confirm that
the given allocation is the nucleolus. If we did not have such unique value
within the first 20 excesses, we would have needed to solve the problem again
calculating any other number of excesses strictly greater than 20 (as detailed
in Algorithm 1, where we calculated the first 2×20 excesses). The algorithm
would stop when at least one of the first largest excesses yields a unique
value.
The running time was 34 seconds. This example was solved on a Packard
Bell computer, with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 2.80 GHz processor, 6 GB of
RAM memory, running on Windows 7 (64 bits). The rest of experiments
were solved in the same computer.
5.2. Solution in two steps
It may happen that the allocation obtained is not guaranteed to be the
nucleolus, because none of the kmax largest excesses yields a unique value.
For instance, consider kmax = 10. Our iterative process would run as follows:
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1. m = 1. The solution obtained is the same as the one before. The differ-
ence is that now we can only guarantee that the 10 largest excesses are
lexicographically minimum. Note that among the 10 largest excesses
(which are the same as before) there is not a unique value, and there-
fore we cannot guarantee that the obtained solution is the nucleolus.
This first iteration took 31 seconds. In this case, we would proceed to
the next iteration, imposing the values Tk for the 10 largest excesses.
2. m = 2. We now solve the problem for this value ofm. The new solution
is the same as before. Now, since we can guarantee that the first 20
excesses are lexicographically minimum, we can therefore guarantee
that the solution obtained is the nucleolus, and we stop the process.
This second iteration took 79 seconds.
6. Computational results
In this section we show some characteristics observed when calculating
the nucleoli of the family of games defined in Section 5 for number of players
n = 10, ..., 18. Table 1 shows the obtained results for the different values
of n. More specifically, the columns refer to the kmax used, the first sorted
excess whose value is unique, the constant δ used, and the computational
time needed to solve the corresponding problems. The nucleoli for these
games are shown in the appendix. All our codes are written in GAMS 23.0.6
using CPLEX 11.2.1 and are available upon request.
We first note that the constant δ could be fixed to 0.1 in all cases. We also
noted that the first unique value was always among the 20 largest excesses,
except for n = 18, although we can observe an increase in such value with n.
16
n kmax First unique δ Time Iter
10 20 13 0.1 0.62 1
11 20 13 0.1 1.06 1
12 20 14 0.1 2.80 1
13 20 16 0.1 10.44 1
14 20 16 0.1 34.80 1
15 20 16 0.1 117.10 1
16 20 20 0.1 432.93 1
17 20 19 0.1 1666.70 1
18 10 20 0.1 6490.00 + 6456.41 + 13054.40 3
Table 1: Results. Columns mean: number of players, maximum power of δ, first unique
excess, value of δ, computation time (in seconds), and number of iterations needed with
the considered parameters. See the obtained nucleoli for each game in the Appendix.
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As a matter of fact, fitting these data to the linear function
k∗ = 0.9881n+ 2.5357, (17)
where k∗ denotes the first excess that yields a unique value, has a linear
coefficient of determination R2 = 0.8748, and we therefore could consider a
linear increase in this value with respect to n. Finally, we note that when
fitting the computational time vs. n via the exponential function
T ime = 3× 10−6e1.1636n, (18)
the coefficient of determination is R2 = 0.9915. Therefore assuming a (logi-
cal) exponential increase in computational time with n seems reasonable.
Finally, for n = 18 we considered kmax = 10 in order to reduce the number
of constraints, due to memory problems in the computer used. Note that in
this case we needed three iterations.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a procedure to calculate the nucleolus of
any benefit game, without restrictions of non-emptiness in imputation set,
core set, etc. The approach consists of solving a unique linear programming
problem. Since the formulation of this problem involves a constant smaller
than one powered to large exponents, one could find some troubles when
solving it because some of these powers might be considered zero by comput-
ers’ precision. In order to avoid this problem, we have proposed an iterative
method that stops when the obtained solution is guaranteed to be the nucle-
olus. Such condition is met when, among the largest excesses that have been
lexicographically minimized, at least one of them is unique.
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In order to illustrate our method, we have detailed the calculation of a
14-player game’s nucleolus. The applicability of our method has been shown
by calculating the nucleoli of games with number of players ranging from 10
to 18. The characteristic function of such games is deterministic and has
been given implicitly, and therefore these experiments could be replicated by
other researches working on the nucleolus or other allocations for TU games.
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